

**SECRET**OLC 79-0113/5  
25 January 1979

SUBJECT: Comments on HSCA Drafts

**I. Miscellaneous Issues - HTLINGUAL Index Cards**

- Page 2. Names of Egerter, O'Neal, Rocca (C)  
Page 3. Names of Hartman and Egerter (C)  
Page 6. Egerter's name (C)

**II. Miscellaneous Issues - Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 Opening Sheet - "AG"**

This draft reflects the insistence of HSCA investigators in pursuing the meaning of "AG" on a random basis for some time, rather than making a formal request to the Agency. They asked a series of people who would not have had the working-level technical knowledge with which to answer this question. When a request was finally made to the Agency, the answer was forthcoming. "AG" is computer language for American defector to the East. (C)

The only reason that this was ever worth considering (not that an answer was not officially available) was the working thesis that "AG" meant Agent. Having wasted so much time in pursuing the question in a furtive and groping fashion, they now feel it necessary to spend 5 1/2 pages discussing it further. What "AG" means is clear and accurate; exactly when this particular piece of computer language was developed is the subject of disagreement, but that is of no real significance. (U)

- Page 1. Rocca's name (C)  
Page 2. Rocca's and Egerter's names (C)  
Pages 3-6. Hartman's name (C)

**RETURN TO CIA  
Background Use Only  
Do Not Reproduce**

**III. ZRRIFLE**

A. The assertions of Harvey's "known" antagonism and hatred of "the Kennedy's" are at least dubious, if not seriously distorted. (U)

For the purposes of perspective, Harvey came to the Cuban operation late in the game. The point is he was not involved in the Bay of Pigs operation and any personal attitude he held on that

22480

DERIVATIVE CL BY 1-3190  
 DECL  REVW ON Jan 1985  
DERIVED FROM 363

**SECRET**

14-00000  
**SECRET**

activity was removed in time from the actual event. In fact, he was the second man to run the Cuban Task Force subsequent to the Bay of Pigs. (U)

Harvey was a tough, blunt man. He called things the way he saw them. This characteristic possibly was responsible for his reassignment from the Cuban program, but more importantly, he would have had no illusions on that score. Reportedly, he did feel that the Administration was uncertain in what it wanted to do against Cuba; he reportedly believed that it lacked determination and fortitude. He finally told the Attorney General that they (Robert Kennedy and General Lansdale) had to make up their minds; they wanted dramatic operations against Cuba, but without the publicity that such activities inevitably would generate. In making this point, he reportedly told them that they wanted "to do it with mirrors." This appears to have led to his replacement at the personal request of the Attorney General. (U)

It is safe to assume resentment on Harvey's part. However, he was a realistic and experienced government employee, and does not exactly fit the fantasies that inexperienced persons may wish to weave about him. He was a man more likely to particularize in such matters, and such resentment as he would have felt would have been directed at the Attorney General rather than as suggested in the draft report, "the Kennedy's." (U)

Harvey was a man who uniquely kept his own counsel. There would be very few who would truly have been privy to his views. It is doubted that the Committee has competent evidence on this score, whatever the generalized descriptions that it might have received. (C)

Assertions of what is "known" about Harvey's general attitude towards "the Kennedy's" may provide a convenient hook for ascribing to him the motive that would serve as the basis for looking at ZRRIFLE as a possible instrument of the President's association. ZRRIFLE, because of Harvey's involvement in plotting against Castro is a proper subject for attention by the Committee, but the basis for this speculative point of departure serves more to distort the record than to illuminate it. (U)

B. At the bottom of page 2 a statement is made that the CIA made the ZRRIFLE file available only after "repeated requests." The first request for this information that was made to the office that provided it came from the HSCA investigator working the problem. His unacceptable churlish manner received the direct response it merited, which may explain why he never approached that office again. The material was requested in January and was made available in January. The information was made available at once, but languished for weeks before he took advantage of it.

**SECRET**

14-00000  
SECRET

This was not unusual on the part of the investigators; large quantities of material assembled and made available for review was never reviewed. (U)

C. The treatment of ZRRIFLE emphasizes considerations during the initial period when ZRRIFLE was being studied. It ignores the fact that the Committee has in its possession unrefuted statements, with references to supporting information, showing that these various things were never done. My letter to Blakey (27 Sept 78) outlines a good bit of this. (U)

This section of the report is rather badly conceived and unconvincingly presented. (U)

#### IV. Helsinki

Page 4. References to CIA files on the Soviet Consul in Helsinki raises a sources-and-methods question. References to "two CIA dispatches from [Helsinki]" highlights the existence of the Station there. General references to the name of the Soviet Consul should be considered to determine if the story can be told without using that name. (C)

#### V. Untitled, Hand-Written Draft on Non-Interviewing of Oswald

On the first page, as a matter of organization, the third sentence describes CIA's "claim that no records existed" as stimulating speculation that Oswald had some relationship with the Agency. In fact, CIA was not making its "claim" in a vacuum, but was responding to allegations which already reflected such speculation. (U)

At the top of the second page there is a statement about a DCI affidavit being in response to a Warren Commission request. At the top of the next page the statement is made that the affidavit "was partially instigated by a newspaper article." It may be that the Warren Commission request resulted from the newspaper story, but it is not customary for CIA to issue affidavits as a response to newspaper stories; simply, as stated, it did so in response to the Warren Commission request. (U)

On page 6 the crypt KUJUMP is used. (C)

Page 10-13 the names of Halligan (P.?), Tamprelle (P.?), and Dennis Densyla (sic) (T.?). (C)

Again at pages 20-21 the names of Citrynell, Webster, and Kiniarelli (T/P?). (C)

SECRET

1190

14-00000  
SECRET

In considering why Oswald was not in fact interviewed on his return from the U.S.S.R., assuming that he could have been, the HSCA draft omits information that it was provided to the effect that the Soviet Union was allowing large numbers of its citizens to migrate and that this had flooded the machinery at that time. (U)

VI. Alvarado

The true identity of Alvarado has been protected by the Warren Commission and the Church Committee; it should be handled in this report with the "D" identity being used. (C)

It is noted that references are made to the Mexico City Station at pages 7, 8, 11, 13, 17, 22, and 25. (C)

The name of Birch O'Neal appears at pages 9<sup>o</sup> and 16. Win<sub>DB</sub> Scott appears at page 18. Alvarado's Nicaraguan [case officer] [Jerez,] is mentioned at pages 16, 17, and 21. (C)

References to intercepted conversations appear at pages 17, 19, and 26. (S)

Use of the polygraph - It was mentioned in connection with Alvarado in the Warren Commission report. It is mentioned here at pages 17, 22, and 23. Does it raise a methods question? (C)

At about line 20, page 3, Alvarado's name is used where apparently Oswald's name was intended. (C)

At page 12 of the draft a statement is made to the effect that Ambassador Mann's efforts to investigate the possibility of Cuban complicity were being "restrained." The issue is that what the Ambassador was trying to prove is not necessarily the same thing as an investigation. If he was trying to direct certain findings, then failure to follow his predilections is subject to a different description. (U)

On page 23, the report states that it is unclear whether the latitude to be given the polygraph operator implied that Alvarado's polygraph was designed to prove his story a fabrication. Actually it is clear from the statement preceding that one that reliable actions were wanted, the polygraph operator having been instructed that Alvarado was to be "well-fed, rested, and not in fear of bodily harm." In other words, he was to be in good shape to ensure that his responses were as reliable as possible. The observations of the report on this point are strange. (C)

SECRET

2/20

14-00000  
  
**SECRET**

The treatment on page 26, of Ambassador Mann's interruption, is somewhat confused. If the reference to Mann's request "that Cuban diplomatic personnel be arrested," is intended for Duran there is some imprecision. She was a Mexican citizen, employed by the Consulate, not to be categorized as diplomatic personnel. Did he want others arrested? (U)

On page 28 the draft says that FBI and CIA doubted Alvarado's veracity. It is correct to say that they had professional doubts that were vindicated. (C)

Page 29 talks about uncertain jurisdictional issues, without reference to the rather close cooperation between the CIA and the Legal Attache's office on the Alvarado matter, while the jurisdictional matter was being worked out.

**SECRET**